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This article sets out to examine the degree to which democratic transition in Serbia after 
2000 has brought about a democratic mode of crime governance in the country. It is shown 
that while penal norms and policies have undergone a significant degree of democratisation 
in that their outlook has tended not to be punitive, the judiciary (and, to some degree, other 
actors in the penal field) has been increasingly inclined towards punitive practices. Taking 
an institutional approach to explain this discrepancy, the article argues that pockets of 
authoritarianism in the executive have survived the transition to democracy and have 
continued to exert pressure on the judiciary in ways that have influenced judicial decision-









Crime appears to have been figuring significantly more prominently in Serbia’s public 
domain over recent years. Both mainstream and tabloid media outlets, for example, have 
increasingly devoted attention to sensational crime stories that are likely to evoke emotional 
reactions amongst the public, a trend also observed in political discourse in the country. 
The aim of this article is, first, to identify the ways in which Serbian state authorities have 
been dealing with issues of crime and crime control, especially as concerns related 
developments in the penal field, and second, to discern the ways in which penal 
developments themselves have been influenced by the general process of democratization 
in the country since 2000. The article, in other words, aims to assess whether, and the 
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extent to which, the general process of democratization in Serbia has led to a more 
democratic governance of crime; that is, a mode of crime governance that adheres to norms 
and promotes policies and practices that are conducive to balanced, parsimonious and 
dignified punishment.  
 
 Chronologically, the focus of the article is on penal transformations that have 
occurred in Serbia since the end of the Second World War. In particular, the article 
compares penal norms, policies and practices that have characterized the Serbian penal 
field since the coming of democracy in the country in 2000, to those prevalent under the 
two previous post-war regimes: communism (1945-1989) and post-communist 
authoritarianism (1990-1999). The descriptive part of the analysis shows that, although 
penal norms and policies have undergone a significant degree of democratisation in that 
their outlook has tended not to be punitive, the judiciary (and, to some degree, other actors 
in the penal field) has been increasingly inclined towards punitive practices. To account for 
this discrepancy, the article takes an institutional approach, interrogating the degree to 
which separation of powers, itself an essential component of democracy, has been achieved 
in Serbia since 2000. It is argued that pockets of authoritarianism in the executive have 
survived the transition to democracy and have continued to exert pressure on the judiciary 
in ways that have tipped the balance of judicial decision-making towards punitiveness. 
What has thus emerged is what may be termed ‘authoritarian governance of crime within 
democracy’.  
 
Democratic transformations of the Serbian penal field  
 
The ‘punishment and society’ literature which put ‘the changing nature of punishment at 
the centre of an inquiry into the question of social order’ (Simon and Sparks, 2013: 4) 
gained prominence in late 1970s. At the beginning of the 21st-century, there is no shortage 
of accounts of the role of punishment in contemporary society, especially in the US and the 
UK. For instance, Garland (2001) identifies the ways in which social, political and cultural 
changes since the 1970s (what he terms ‘the coming of late modernity’) caused a shift from 
a rehabilitative and inclusive penal system (‘penal welfarism’) towards a repressive and 
exclusionary one. Simon (2007) demonstrates how the ‘new’ regulation of crime became a 
‘model’ for dealing with problems pertaining to other areas of social life - the family, the 
school and the workplace. And Wacquant (2009) highlights state transformations that 
render punitiveness a means by which lower social classes are kept in check. 
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 These accounts have been challenged in two main ways. First, there are examples of 
countries that have experienced similar social, political, economic or cultural circumstances 
but different penal outcomes (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Snacken and Durmortier, 2012; 
Tonry, 2007). And second, similar penal trends have been observed in countries undergoing 
different trajectories in terms of their social, political, economic or cultural conditions. 
Findings in this latter respect have primarily concerned certain ex-communist countries in 
Central and Southeastern Europe. Following a period during which criminal legislation that 
served ideological purposes was substituted by human rights-based legislation, a shift 
mostly prompted by the conditions of membership of the Council of Europe, these 
countries have more recently witnessed punitive trends in terms of penal politics, policies 
and public opinion (Kossowska et al., 2012). Whether realistic or not, fear of rising crime 
rates in the immediate post-democratisation era (Karstedt, 2003; Levay, 2000; Šelih, 2012) 
cannot explain all such trends, from the rise of populist law-and-order rhetoric in Estonia 
and Poland (Saar, 2004; Krajewski, 2004), to the surge of public punitiveness in Slovenia 
(Meško and Jere, 2012), to the ascendance of punitive policies in Lithuania and Hungary 
(Dobryninas and Sakalauskas, 2011; Levay, 2012).  
 
  Serbia was among the last ex-communist states in Europe to undergo democratic 
transition. Already in 1948, Yugoslavia replaced hardline, ‘Soviet-type’ communism with 
state socialism, thereby presumably increasing its potential to democratize swiftly. Yet the 
road to democracy turned out to be long and hard. Although the country subscribed to a 
moderate version of communism, over the next forty years it found itself mired in internal 
political strife and harsh oppression –which often relied on criminal law– against the ruling 
elite’s political opponents. The destructive civil wars of the 1990s, which eventually led to 
the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, further slowed down the 
transition. The first Serbian multi-party elections of 1990 brought Slobodan Milošević to 
power, thus postponing ‘real’ democracy until his removal from office in 2000. Although 
Milošević won the 1990 elections, the next 10 years of his rule were marked by clear 
authoritarian tendencies and doubtful popular support (Goati, 2001). Apart from being 
responsible, at least in part, for the break-up of former Yugoslavia and accused of 
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity (for which he was indicted and 
prosecuted before the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)), his 
rule also led to the international isolation of Serbia, the imposition of economic sanctions, 
and NATO bombing in 1999.  
 
 Throughout this period, Milošević used state media and censorship to silence political 
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opposition. For example, the 1998 Public Information Law (Zakon o javnom informisanju) 
undermined the freedom of independent media and imposed draconian fines on journalists 
writing against the regime (see more in Lilić et al., 1998). A number of journalists (such as 
Slavko Ćuruvija and Dada Vujasinović), as well as a prominent political opponent of 
Milošević (Ivan Stambolić), were murdered, while the assassination of an oppositional 
leader, Vuk Drašković, was attempted on a number of occasions. Additionally, the success 
of Milošević’s party in each election held since 1990 has been disputed in light of 
allegations of electoral fraud. On at least two occasions, efforts to distort electoral 
outcomes succumbed to political protest: in 1997, after 96 days of protests, Milošević 
finally admitted that the opposition parties had won the local elections, and in 2000, after a 
two-week stalemate, he recognized he had lost the Presidential elections to the opposition 
candidate Vojislav Koštunica.1 He was extradited to ICTY in 2001, where he died in 2006. 
Post-2000, Serbia has seemingly picked up democratic pace, gaining membership of the 
Council of Europe in 2003 and European Union candidateship status in 2012. The 
country’s ‘level of freedom’ –an indicator the US-based organization Freedom House uses 
to measure access to political rights and civil liberties internationally– has increased from 6 
(7 being the lowest) in 1998 to 2 in 2014 (Freedom House, 2014). 
 
 Undeniable post-2000 improvements notwithstanding, academic commentators have 
nevertheless warned of certain negative trends occurring in the field of punishment during 
the same period, including, for example, ‘populism’ (Ignjatović, 2010), ‘vindictiveness’ 
(Soković, 2011) and ‘expansionism’ (Stojanović, 2011a). Unfortunately, such claims are 
usually only substantiated by reference to anecdotal evidence, and a more thorough analysis 
is needed to establish the characteristics of the Serbian penal field. To assess the level of 
penal democratization in Serbia, the article focuses on three issues: a) the dominant penal 
philosophy, b) penal policies pertaining to substantive, procedural and executive criminal 
law; and c) penal practices and the behavior of specific actors in the penal field. This 
exploration of penal democratization will aim to determine the extent to which the existing 
penal approach in Serbia is conducive to the protection of offenders’ human rights, penal 
moderation and a sober reaction to crime which avoids not only ideological, but also 




1 For a detailed analysis of electoral manipulations between 1990 and 2000, see Goati, 2001. 
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‘Protective’ punishment as the dominant penal philosophy 
 
In contemporary Serbia, the dominant official penal goal is ‘the suppression of acts that 
harm … values protected by criminal legislation’ (Krivični zakonik, article 4). Usually 
termed by Serbian penal theorists ‘the protective goal of punishment’ (Stojanović, 2011b), 
this objective is meant to be achieved through proportional punishment for the guilty 
offender, which aims both at retribution towards her and general prevention as concerns 
the broader public. The imposition of criminal sanctions is based on strict sentencing 
ranges, while additional rules (regarding, for instance, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances) allow for fine-tuning of the sanction. 
 
 Unlike criminal law that applies to adult offenders, juvenile criminal law is explicitly 
welfarist, often stipulating measures aimed at ‘influencing appropriate development’, 
‘strengthening personal responsibility’, ‘providing supervision, protection and help’, 
‘securing general and specific training’ and ‘reintegrating into society’. To this end, a more 
lenient system of sanctions, unobtrusive procedural rules and specialized criminal justice 
agencies were introduced in 2005. With the exception of juvenile imprisonment, all other 
sanctions are explicitly of a welfarist orientation. Juvenile imprisonment is an extraordinary 
measure that can last between six months and five years (exceptionally up to 10 years) and 
may only be imposed upon ‘older minors’ (16-18 years of age). It is rare in practice, with 
less than 1% of the overall prison population being juveniles (ICPS, 2015; MPRS, 2014). 
Even when it comes to imprisonment, the law repeatedly makes reference to minors’ 
‘interests’, ‘needs’ and ‘special circumstances’, and provides for substantial post-release 
assistance. 
 
 More generally, prisoners’ status has been greatly influenced by the ‘human rights’ 
agenda, and is consequently constituted by legally entrenched rights. Restrictions of rights 
are justified only inasmuch as they are absolutely necessary. The formal goal of 
imprisonment is to help the prisoner ‘adopt socially acceptable values’, so as to promote 
reintegration and prevent future offending (Zakon o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija, Article 8, 
31-32). To achieve this, the law grants prisoners substantial rights; amongst others, to work, 
communicate with the outside world, receive visits (including conjugal visits), vote, receive 
legal aid and education, and practice religion.  
 
 The Serbian protective approach is not to be confused with the rehabilitative 
philosophy of punishment that has often been criticized for its coerciveness (Von Hirsch, 
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1976). It focuses less on intervention and treatment and more on providing the tools – such 
as primary and secondary education or vocational training – which facilitate prisoners’ 
reintegration post-release. Furthermore, owing to an extensive set of rights and a firm 
desire to make the prison experience as ‘normal’ as possible, prisoners are removed from 
political and social life only insofar as institutional circumstances make this necessary. 
 
Transformative penal policies 
 
Penal transformation in Serbia started well before 2000. Already in 1951, the then new 
penal code moved away from ‘notoriously punitive’ communist penal tendencies 
(Krajewski, 2004) and towards a ‘legalistic’, ‘German’ model (Srzentić et al., 1998). From 
1951 to 2005, the year that the first ‘democratic’ Serbian Criminal code was introduced, 
Yugoslavia abolished the use of analogy (a principle which allowed prosecution not only of 
acts prescribed as crimes but also of acts merely resembling crimes), the material definition 
of crime (according to which a key element of crime is its ‘socially dangerous’ nature, 
thereby allowing judges to drop charges at will even if all other, formal conditions to 
prosecute cases were met), as well as ideological sanctions and ‘socialist self-management’ 
as the incrimination rationale (while some sanctions were openly aimed against ideological 
opponents, the broader purpose of criminal law was explicitly the protection of the specific 
type of communist order which existed in Yugoslavia at the time).  
 
 Post-2000 modifications sought to codify criminal law and implement European 
human rights standards (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2005; Pihler, 2006). The ‘human rights’ 
agenda presented a new paradigm within which criminal law was further to develop, and 
transformative changes have since taken place in substantive, procedural and executive 
criminal legislation. In terms of substantive criminal law, the most important changes have 
concerned the system of criminal sanctions. The death penalty was abolished in 2002, with 
around half of the public being supportive of this development (Nikolić and Žarevac, 2002; 
Srbija protiv smrtne kazne, 2013). Although the death penalty was last imposed in 2001, no 
offender had been executed since 1992 (Politika, 2007), which is reflective of the 
ambivalence towards its use long before it was abolished. Indeed, the range of crimes for 
which the death penalty could be imposed had already been reduced to only two by the time 
of its abolition. Two sanctions remained (imprisonment and fine), and two were added 
(community service and driving license revocation).  
 
 There is no life imprisonment in Serbia. The maximum term of imprisonment is 20 
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years, though custodial sentences can exceptionally range from 30 to 40 years for 
particularly grave offences; a measure applied only rarely, with fewer than 20 such 
sentences being meted out annually (RZZS, 2013b). The duration of imprisonment is 
practically shortened through the use of parole for which adults are eligible after serving 
two-thirds of their sentence, and juveniles after serving one-third of theirs. There are four 
alternatives to imprisonment: (1) ‘house arrest’ (introduced in 2009); (2) ‘community 
service’, that is, ‘socially beneficial labor’ explicitly aimed at diverting the offender away 
from imprisonment; (3) probation (or suspended imprisonment), a long-standing alternative 
that accounts for 50-60% of all sanctions in Serbia (RZZS, 2013a); and (4) ‘judicial 
warning’, a preferred sanction for first-time perpetrators of non-serious crimes. An income-
based system of daily fines was also introduced in 2005, which substituted legislatively 
fixed fines.  
 
 Furthermore, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakonik o krivičnom postupku) of 
2001 predominantly sought to adopt the principles enshrined in the European Convention 
on Human Rights and other relevant treaties. Amongst others, it introduced: the ne bis in 
idem principle (which prohibits prosecution and punishment for the same act more than 
once); the prohibition of torture, degrading or manipulative acts against the accused; 
additional alternatives to remand custody; the determination of the maximum duration of 
remand both before and after indictment; the right to an attorney from the initial contact of 
the suspect with the police and extensive communication rights between the accused and 
her attorney; obligatory defense in specific cases (e.g., for serious crimes, offenders in 
remand custody, offenders with psychological disabilities); the accused’s right to withhold 
her statement; the abolition of police-imposed remand; and the limitation of ‘police 
detention’ to 48 hours during which the suspect has the same rights as the accused (see for 
more details Grubač and Beljanski, 2002).  
 
 Additionally, victim rights in contemporary Serbia have also improved. Victims have 
always had the ‘damaged party’ status, which allows them to file a compensation claim 
during the criminal trial, and have (since 1929) also had an opportunity to become 
‘subsidiary prosecutors’ in crimes prosecuted ex officio - i.e., to become the principal 
prosecutor when the public prosecutor drops the case. More recently, however, additional 
rights were granted to victims of particular crimes (sex and family-related crimes, 
organized and war crimes, and crimes involving victims under the age of 18). Particular 
emphasis was placed on tackling offences targeting women and children, and from the 
1980s onwards, a steady commitment on the part of women’s rights organizations led to the 
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drafting of legislative proposals and the introduction of victim assistance programs 
(hotlines, shelters and safe-houses) (see Ćopić and Nikolić, 2004; Nikolić-Ristanović, 
2007).  
 
 Finally, the 2005 Law on the Execution of Criminal Sanctions (Zakon o izvršenju 
krivičnih sankcija) extended and fortified offender rights, particularly those pertaining to 
prisoners, so as to bring them in line with the European Prison Rules. For example, the law 
adopted the principle of ultima ratio regarding the limitations of prisoners’ rights (whereby 
rights are restricted as little as necessary to achieve the desired goal), forbade torture and 
demeaning acts, embraced dignity and non-discrimination of prisoners, and provided 
judicial safeguards. Furthermore, the law secured a wider spectrum of rights than before, 
pertaining not only to food, shelter and health provisions, but also to rights to education, 
work, information, and religion. Finally, measures concerning the administration of order 
and discipline were strictly regulated – here again the principle of ultima ratio has been 
applied – while sanctions such as solitary confinement were reserved for exceptional cases 
(see further Pihler, 2006). 
 
 Moving towards the opposite direction has been legislation regarding sex offences. In 
particular, a law informally known as Marija’s Law (named after an 8 year old girl who 
was raped and murdered) and resembling Megan’s Law in the US was adopted in Serbia in 
2013, henceforth providing for a range of ‘special measures’ for sex offenders, including, 
for example, elimination of the statute of limitations and ineligibility for parole.  
 
Practices and behavior of specific actors in the penal field 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of norms and policies as indicators of democratization in 
the penal field, their usefulness is limited if they are not explored in conjunction with 
practices on the ground. With this in mind, below I continue my exploration of Serbia’s 
penal domain by looking at practices followed by the police and the judiciary.2  
 
 With regard to policing, the system in Serbia operates rather ‘traditionally’. That is to 
say, policing occurs ex post facto and follows the slow bureaucratic route; criminal events 																																																								
2 It should be noted at this juncture that the Serbian state remains solely responsible for the provision of 
security. With a few minor exceptions, the key operations of the criminal justice system - from policing to the 
execution of criminal sanctions - remain in state hands.  	
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are treated as something to react to, not prevent.3 Police over-reaction to crime has been 
apparent in so-called police ‘campaigns’ that are aimed at enhancing the ‘tough-on-crime’ 
image of the police in the eyes of the public (Ignjatović, 2003). Campaigns follow a 
preordained pattern: a particular problem, such as child pornography or drug trafficking, is 
identified and exploited by the media, the police then launch an operation under a pompous 
code name (e.g., Armageddon, Thunder, Balkan Warrior, Shredder, Cleaner), performing 
mass arrests within short periods of time, before the outcomes of the campaign are 
ultimately circulated by the media.  
 
 Turning to sentencing practices and particularly the use of imprisonment in Serbia, 
currently the harshest penal sanction available to the country’s judges, Figure 1 presents 
trends between 1979 and 2012 in the annual absolute number of prison sentences passed, 
the annual absolute number of all types of sentence passed, and the annual absolute number 
of offences recorded by the police. Whilst the annual volume of all sentences passed 
underwent notable fluctuations over time, the annual volume of prison sentences remained 
remarkably stable. Importantly, neither trend appears to have been traceable to crime rates. 
Increases in the occurrence of serious crimes and recidivism rates go some way towards 
explaining the stability in the use of imprisonment in Serbia, yet judges have also been 













3 There are two exceptions to this. One is the use of private security and CCTV systems by banks, shopping 
malls and nightclubs, which have themselves proliferated since the fall of communism in the country. The 
other concerns preventive measures against sports hooliganism (Savković and Đorđević, 2010), and the 
introduction of the ‘school policeman’ (in 2002), an example of the paternalism that the state has traditionally 
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Figure 1. Trends in prison sentences passed, all types of sentences passed, and police-
recorded offences in Serbia, 1979-2012 (absolute numbers, per year) 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 2, between 1993 and 2012, the annual total of prisoners rose 
steadily (with the exception of a slight drop in 2012 due to amnesty). This rise stands out 
both historically and internationally: although imprisonment rates have also risen in other 
transitional societies, over the last twenty years Serbia has had the fastest rising prison 
population in Europe (Tripković, 2010). Since 1993, Serbia’s prison population has nearly 
quadrupled, from 37 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants in 1993, to 140 in 2013 (ICPS, 
2015). In good part as a result of this, Serbian prisons are overcrowded, their occupancy 
currently standing at 109% (ICPS, 2015).   
 
 The surge of Serbia’s prison population has been due to an overall increase in the 
length of custodial sentences passed by courts, combined with a decrease in the use of 
parole, as well as a rise in the use of remand imprisonment. As demonstrated in Figure 3, 
the most common length of custodial sentences meted out by Serbian courts does not 
exceed one year. Since 2006, however, the annual volume of sentences up to one year has 







1993 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Prison population numbers (data available post-1993)
Number of remand prisoners (data available post-2005)
Number of paroled prisoners (data available post-2005)
years has been rising. What has caused this development is not immediately clear. 
Legislative changes have not been punitive; if anything, many behaviours have been 
decriminalised and sentencing maximums have been reduced. Even if one were to accept 
that more serious crimes that warrant longer terms of imprisonment have been perpetrated 
in Serbia over recent years, the degree to which long sentences have become more 
prevalent would still appear disproportionate. To this extent, it seems fair to suggest that 
the increasing use of longer sentences since the mid-2000s has largely been reflective of a 
change in judges’ own decision-making practices.  
 
 Meanwhile, the eligibility criteria for release on parole were tightened twice: the time 
required to be served before a prisoner becomes eligible for parole was increased from one-
third to one-half of the sentence in 2005, and subsequently from one-half to two-thirds of 
the sentence in 2009. Additionally, in 2005, prison-based parole boards were substituted by 
judicial committees, which may have been less likely to grant parole to eligible prisoners. 
One way or another, as shown in Figure 2, the annual total of paroled prisoners has 
undergone an overall drop since the mid-2000s. During the same period, moreover, the 
annual number of pre-trial detainees also rose (see Figure 2), despite the fact that pertinent 
statutory rules did not become tougher and, indeed, a range of alternatives to remand 
imprisonment had already been introduced since 2001. Once again, judicial punitiveness 















Figure 2. Convicted, remand and paroled prisoners in Serbia, 1993-2012 
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Figure 3. The length of prison sentences in Serbia, 1993-2012 (absolute numbers, per 
year) 
 
 Whilst both penal philosophy and most legislative changes in contemporary Serbia 
have been oriented towards penal moderation, crime has nevertheless been subject to 
politicization, particularly by populist political elites. Indeed, all Prime Ministers post-2000 
placed the ‘fight on crime’ high up on their government’s agenda (there have been 6 
governments of diverse political orientations during this timeframe; see further Vlada 
Republike Srbije, 2014). Furthermore, politicians have frequently drawn public attention to 
rare and shocking violent criminal incidents in order to arouse anxieties over security. In 
2010, for instance, the then Minister of Interior Ivica Dačić warned that ‘crime is the 
biggest evil which tears apart and kills a nation’ (B92, 2010a), while the President of Serbia 
Boris Tadić proclaimed that fighting crime ‘is not only about the security of the state, but 
also about the future of generations, the future of every child in Serbia’ (B92, 2010b). The 
degree to which such discourse has in fact led to higher rates of fear of crime is debatable, 
though it has certainly allowed those in power to demonstrate their uncompromising stance 





Blurring the line that separates powers: Authoritarian tendencies within democratic 
crime control 
 
To recap, there are signs that the Serbian penal domain has undergone a significant degree 
of democratization both in terms of norms and various (though not all) policies introduced 
after 2000. Indeed, unlike other former communist states whose penal systems changed 
quite abruptly, the long process of democratization of the penal field in Yugoslavia 
(including Serbia) began more than 60 years ago, and followed a slow (and bumpy) road of 
progress since then. As concerns judicial practices, however, these have grown stricter in 
recent years, despite relatively constant crime rates. This finding begs an exploration of the 
institutional arrangements that facilitate or otherwise contribute to the manifestation of such 
practices in the first instance. 
 
 By contrast with the US and the UK, where the penal field has apparently become 
‘reconfigured entirely’ (Garland, 2001: 23), a point also raised by Levay (2012) in relation 
to the more comparable case of post-2009 Hungary, state punitiveness in Serbia appears to 
have been limited mainly (albeit not solely) to judicial practices. But why would Serbia’s 
judiciary engage in punitive practices when penal policy itself has moved towards 
moderation? In the case of the US, as Tonry (2007) reminds us, judges are elected directly 
by the public, which implies they may pursue punitive sentencing practices to placate 
popular sentiment and secure electoral support. In the Serbian case, although judges are 
appointed by an independent judicial body and are therefore more likely to be insulated 
from punitive sentiments amongst the public, they have long been dependent on the 
executive, not just before democratization but also since it began.  
 
 The new constitution adopted in Serbia in 2006 explicitly provided for the separation 
of powers (a principle already introduced in the constitution passed in 1990). Yet judges 
were essentially brought under the direct influence of the executive, forced as they were to 
reapply for the very position to which they had been appointed, supposedly permanently, 
under the previous constitution of 1990. The High Judicial Council (Visoki savet sudstva), 
the body in charge of the re-appointment process, was constituted in a way which allowed 
for political influence as one-third of its 11 members did not come from the judiciary, and 
some of them were members of the executive (apart from seven judges, the rest of the 
membership included: the minister of justice, the head of the judicial parliamentary 
committee, one attorney, and one law professor). Indeed, during the process of re-
appointments, two of the seven judges sitting on the Council spoke publicly about the 
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political pressures that they were experiencing, which subsequently led one of them to 
resign (Rakić-Vodinelić et al., 2012). A series of further impediments were in place, 
including, amongst others, lack of clarity in the criteria for re-appointment, which made it 
difficult to establish who had the ‘expertise’, ‘competence’ and ‘worthiness’ to be a judge; 
exclusion of the public from the proceedings; lack of reasoning in decisions not to 
reappoint; and lack of independence in the complaint procedure, given that the very same 
body that was responsible for re-appointment decisions was also entrusted with the task of 
judging complaints against them (see further Rakić-Vodinelić et al., 2012).  
 
 The re-appointment process, which was presented as part of a reform aimed at 
satisfying ‘European standards’, resulted in 26% of judges losing their position. Had the 
executive wished to remove those judges who consistently violated citizens’ human rights 
acting as tools of Milošević’s regime, they could have initiated individual proceedings in 
line with the Law on Responsibility for Human Rights Violations (Zakon o odgovornosti za 
kršenje ljudskih prava), which was adopted in 2003 and valid for 10 years thereafter. This 
law, however, was never actually used (Danas, 2013). At the same time, the executive 
subjugated remaining judges to its political whim, destabilizing their position and instilling 
in them a fear that the constitutionally guaranteed permanence of their judicial appointment 
could be just as easily ignored in the future. 
 
 These problems did not go unnoticed internationally. The European Commission, for 
instance, opined that the re-appointment process put ‘at risk the principle of judicial 
independence’, with the composition of the allegedly ‘independent and impartial’ High 
Judicial Council generating ‘a high risk of political influence’ (European Commission, 
2010: 10). Around 800 appeals against decisions not to reappoint were eventually 
submitted to Serbia’s Constitutional Court, and 577 judges eventually were reinstated in 
office (Blic, 2013), although this only occurred after the change of government in 2012, 
thus giving rise to a new round of accusations of political influence. 
 
 It was not the first time that institutional arrangements were put in place with the aim 
to create a politically obedient judicial body that would serve the ‘omnipotent executive’ 
(Rakić-Vodinelić et al., 2012: 114). This strategy had been used in Yugoslavia since the 
1960s, as each new constitution triggered the restructuring of courts and promoted the 
appointment of ‘loyal’ judges (Rakić-Vodinelić et al., 2012) who functioned as a ‘tool in 
the hands of the [Communist] party’ (Šelih, 2012). That the strategy has survived 
democratic transition goes a long way towards explaining why only a small minority of 
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Serbians today –less than 20%, according to research– trust the country’s courts 
(Milošević-Đorđević, 2012), and, indeed, raises questions as to how successful democratic 
transition itself has actually been.  
 
 Having little democratic legitimacy and aiming to secure their own survival, judges 
are inclined towards practices they believe are valued by populist politicians. Recently, the 
President of the Association of Judges of Serbia stated that out of fear for political reprisals, 
judges postpone resolving ‘hot’ cases that are likely to arouse intense media and public 
attention until a statute of limitations sets in. She additionally emphasized that politicians 
effectively often ‘reach verdicts’ on arrested individuals by informing the public that the 
police has completed its investigative work and established guilt (Radio 021, 2014), 
thereby ultimately reducing the role of the judiciary to declaring the ‘truth’ already 
produced by police authorities.  
 
 The executive is also known to have put pressure on judges to place arrestees on 
remand. It was under such pressure, for example, that 2,697 individuals were remanded in 
custody in the context of a police campaign that resulted in 11,000 arrests following the 
assassination of the first democratically elected Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić by an 
organized criminal group in 2003 (BCLJP, 2004), at a time when the country’s prison 
population was around 7,000. Whilst judges have the final say on the use of remand, their 
independence is constrained by fear of removal from office were they to contradict 
mainstream political and public preferences in favour of keeping suspected criminals 
behind bars.  
 
 Although the executive cannot impose custodial sentences, it has been able to 
influence their length through the use of amnesties. In October 2012, the most extensive 
amnesty law in Serbian (and, indeed, Yugoslav) history was adopted through an urgent 
procedure. Without any prior public discussion, the Government proposed and the 
Parliament adopted, if by a narrow majority, amnesty legislation that reduced all custodial 
sentences by 10 to 100%, depending on the sentence length originally determined in court 
(RTS, 2012). The express purpose of this legislation was to resolve the problem of prison 
overcrowding for which Serbia had been repeatedly criticized by the Council of Europe 
(see, for example, CPT, 2014). Large-scale amnesty, in other words, lent itself as an 
exceptional quick-fix solution to a practical problem of the moment, rather than being a 
gesture of leniency or a permanent measure that would fundamentally contradict the 
general trend towards increasing state punitiveness.  
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 The Government itself spoke of the new legislation as ‘the best amnesty law in 
Serbia’s history’. Yet the opposition fiercely criticized it for lacking clarity and 
‘undermining the whole legal order’ by setting free a high number of offenders who did not 
deserve to be released from prison (B92, 2012). Similarly, one of the most prominent 
Serbian NGOs noted what it viewed as the lack of arguments for amnestying prisoners 
(Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, 2012), while the Serbian Police Union stated that the law 
in question had a negative effect on citizens’ trust in state institutions (Radio Slobodna 
Evropa, 2012). While amnesties have commonly been used to alleviate prison 
overcrowding both in ex-communist countries and in developed democracies (see, for 
example, Krajewski, 2004; Nelken, 2010), the scope of Serbia’s latest amnesty law was so 
wide it assumed the form of yet another obtrusive interference into the judicial domain, 
undermining not only judicial authority as such, but also, arguably, the principles of 




The executive’s siege of judicial functions has been a foreseeable consequence of the 
survival of the political elite that governed Serbia after the fall of communism and during 
the 1990s. Although the democratic opposition assumed power in 2000, it proceeded to 
coalesce with ex-regime parties only four years later. As of 2012, moreover, the ‘old 
regime’ again comprised the entire government. The current Prime Minister Aleksandar 
Vučić, for instance, was a radical nationalist during the 1990s and the Minister of 
Information from 1998 to 2000, whilst the current Minister of Foreign Affairs and previous 
Prime Minister Ivica Dačić was for a long time the spokesman for Milošević’s party and 
one of his closest associates. This elite was never permanently ousted from power and it has 
–by changing ‘form’ and ‘formula’ (Tripković, 2007)– paradoxically reestablished itself as 
a ‘pro-European’ force. 
 
 The authoritarian past of Serbia’s dominant political elites has informed their actions 
beyond the penal field as well. In particular, the executive has been culpable of 
systematically silencing dissenting voices and manipulating public opinion. In May 2014, 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe warned of a persistent trend of 
censorship of online content in Serbia, mostly through blocked access to websites critical of 
the government (OSCE, 2014). The Serbian Prime Minister responded himself, claiming 
these remarks were ‘lies’, accusing the Organization of having launched ‘the dirtiest 
possible campaign’, and eventually demanding an apology (Reuters, 2014). Yet concerns 
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that the government has been promoting a ‘strictly controlled freedom’ (Ilić, 2014) have 
also been voiced by the Serbian Ombudsman (B92, 2014) and the Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights, the most prominent domestic human rights organization (BCLJP, 2014), 
whilst the European Commission’s 2014 Progress Report on Serbia made reference to 
‘deteriorating conditions’ for the freedom of expression in the country (European 
Commission, 2014: 13).  
 
 All things considered, even though Serbia (and its ancestor Yugoslavia) experienced a 
relatively moderate form of communism, its subsequent transition to democracy appears to 
have been neither complete nor entirely successful. In this vein, authors such as Bunce and 
Wolchik (2011) consider Serbia as having a ‘semi-authoritarian mixed regime’, which 
combines elements of both democracy and dictatorship. But Serbia is not alone in this 
regard. There is an emerging body of literature which suggests that some of Europe’s 
‘young democracies’ (e.g., Hungary, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania) have been ‘backsliding’ 
into their authoritarian past for at least a decade now (see further Plattner and Diamond, 
2007; Bruszt, 2015; Greskovits, 2015), in addition to facing problems also found in parts of 
Western Europe; most notably, receding levels of public trust in state institutions and 
declining rates of political participation, trends which Peter Mair (2013) has described as 
comprising what he terms the ‘hollowing’ of democracy.  
 
 This article has highlighted the usefulness of punitiveness in the penal field as a key 
criterion for better assessing the scope and level of democratization in post-authoritarian 
contexts. In so doing, the article has shown further, one needs to draw an analytic 
distinction between, on one hand, developments on the levels of penal norms and policy, 
and, on the other hand, penal practices as these occur on the ground, thus allowing for the 
possibility of what I termed earlier ‘authoritarian governance of crime within democracy’. 
As the Serbian case illustrates, moreover, the spread and degree of penal democratization 
itself cannot be fully explained without taking into account the specific institutional 
arrangements that either directly or indirectly influence penal matters, including notably the 
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